
Possible Solutions to the Crisis

Currently, the IAEA is insisting upon sampling and analysis
of the spent fuel removed from the DPRK's gas-graphite
reactor at Yongbyon, a policy that amounts to an attempt to
"roll back" the suspected DPRK nuclear weapons program
[37].

The DPRK refuses to allow this sampling, presumably because
it would definitively prove that the DPRK had diverted fuel
in 1989 and, therefore, had presumably reprocessed and
separated more weapons-usable plutonium than declared. A
new crisis could then arise over efforts to force the DPRK
to confirm the existence of this plutonium (and thus
destroy any weapons made with it) and give it up or at
least place the plutonium under safeguards. Given the North
Korean regime's apparent fear that the U.S. wants to
destroy it, it is unlikely to give up any nuclear deterrent
it has or has led us to believe it has.

One possible alternative to rollback would be to "cap" the
DPRK nuclear program at current levels by conceding for the
moment the one or two bombs the DPRK might now have, while
pressing for continuation of IAEA safeguards on the fuel
now being removed from the 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon. The
North Koreans apparently object not to the IAEA's
monitoring of the fuel rods to ensure they remain at the
reactor site, but only to the assaying of some of the rods
to determine whether plutonium was previously diverted from
the plant. The U.S. and other nations could provide
technology to ensure safe storage of this fuel without
reprocessing. This approach could avoid a showdown that
might precipitate a war with severe nuclear consequences,
even if nuclear weapons were not used (see above). This
approach, however, would concede the DPRK's violation of
the NPT.

Another approach to capping the North Korean nuclear
program would be to let the DPRK out of the NPT, to press
for a Security Council resolution condemning the DPRK and
prohibiting any assistance to it that could be applied to
its nuclear program, and to insist upon IAEA non-NPT
safeguards on the fuel.

The advantage of this approach is that it refuses to accept
the DPRK's exploitation of the benefits of being neither in
nor out of the treaty. With the NPT up for extension next
year, the treaty will be severely undermined if the
situation with the DPRK is essentially the same at that
time as it is today -- a treaty party in clear violation of
the NPT. At a meeting of the Atlantic Council in
Washington, DC on July 22, 1994, Dr. Bruno Pellaud, deputy
director general and head of the safeguards division at
IAEA, stated that although nobody wants to force the DPRK
out of the NPT, IAEA may be getting to the point that it
needs to declare it cannot implement safeguards in North
Korea. DPRK's formal departure from the treaty, he said,
would at least clarify its noncompliance status [20]. It
may be better to deal with the DPRK as a non NPT nation and
seek to cap its program, as we are attempting to do with
such other non-NPT states as India, Israel and Pakistan.

This approach would have the disadvantage of ending
full-scope safeguards on the DPRK nuclear program. Yet
those safeguards are currently more honored in the breach
than in the observance, with the DPRK claiming the right to
choose what safeguards it will permit. The principal
difficulty in letting the DPRK out of the NPT is the signal
it might send to potential renegade NPT states such as Iran
and Libya that they can gain all the diplomatic and
technical benefits of NPT membership, complete their
nuclear weapons program, and then drop out of the treaty
without penalty. This undesirable effect could be
countered, however, by making clear to such NPT parties
that initial violations of the NPT will no longer be
tolerated and overlooked, as was the case with the DPRK's
failure to make good on NPT safeguards commitments in 1987.

Finally, the U.S. should not succumb to pressure from the
DPRK to transfer a light-water reactor (LWR). The U.S. has
offered to help North Korea acquire two LWRs if Pyongyang
halts reprocessing, seals off its reprocessing plant, and
halts construction of two additional graphite-moderated
reactors [38]. U.S. officials assert that trading the DPRK
an LWR for an agreement to shut down its gas-graphite
reactors and reprocessing plant would enhance non
proliferation, both by reducing the amount of plutonium
produced in the DPRK's reactors and by making the DPRK
dependent upon foreign sources of low-enriched uranium fuel
[39]. It is true that an LWR produces less plutonium per
unit of uranium fuel than a gas-graphite reactor. The
difference, however, is marginal from a nonproliferation
perspective: typical LWR spent fuel still contains about 10
kilograms of plutonium in every metric ton of spent fuel.
At this rate, a large (1000-MWe) LWR produces about 260
kilograms of plutonium annually, enough to make 30 to 60
nuclear bombs if the fuel were reprocessed. Moreover, the
DPRK might well tolerate dependence on foreign sources of
enriched uranium fuel just long enough to build up a
substantial stockpile of spent fuel for subsequent
reprocessing, or to develop uranium enrichment capability,
or both.

Transfer of an LWR to the DPRK could have a devastating
effect on the nonproliferation regime, by sending a clear
message that noncompliance with the NPT will not only be
tolerated but rewarded. Instead, the U.S. should offer to
transfer clean-coal combustion and energy efficiency
technologies to the DPRK. Whether accepted or not, such an
offer would put to the test the DPRK's claim that it seeks
nuclear power solely for electricity generation [40].

The stakes have never been higher for nuclear
nonproliferation, and it remains to be seen whether U.S.
diplomacy and international institutions can meet the
challenge. The broader lessons -- the inherent threat to
world order from plutonium and HEU fuels and the need to
overhaul the NPT and IAEA regimes to prohibit use of these
exceedingly dangerous materials -- must not be forgotten
once the current crisis has passed.

